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Abstract
Discovering high-level causal relations from low-level data is an important and challenging prob-
lem that comes up frequently in the natural and social sciences. In a series of papers, Chalupka et
al. (2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2017) develop a procedure for causal feature learning (CFL) in an effort
to automate this task. We argue that CFL does not recommend coarsening in cases where pragmatic
considerations rule in favor of it, and recommends coarsening in cases where pragmatic consider-
ations rule against it. We propose a new technique, pragmatic causal feature learning (PCFL),
which extends the original CFL algorithm in useful and intuitive ways. We show that PCFL has
the same attractive measure-theoretic properties as the original CFL algorithm. We compare the
performance of both methods through theoretical analysis and experiments.
Keywords: Causal Feature Learning; Coarse-Graining; Bayesian Networks; Expected Utility.
1. Introduction
In many scientific contexts, one goal of inquiry is to discover types of fine-grained events that can be
grouped together into a smaller set of more coarse-grained events. This is especially true in causal
analysis, where the goal is often to find some hierarchical structure to improve both the tractabil-
ity and the representational adequacy of models. Developing efficient and reliable computational
methods for mapping low-level data to high-level phenomena is therefore an important step in the
more general task of automating, at least partially, the process of scientific discovery.
Chalupka et al. (2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2017) propose a procedure called causal feature learning
(CFL) to derive macrovariables from microvariables in datasets with some minimal causal struc-
ture. For example, Chalupka et al. (2016a) analyze wind speeds and sea surface temperatures in a
particular region of the Western Pacific Ocean. Using CFL, they partition both sets of variables into
coarse-grained clusters that reveal the causal association between these fine-grained observations
and large-scale weather patterns including El Nin˜o and La Nin˜a.1
The merits of CFL notwithstanding, we argue that the method is ill-equipped to handle the
variable interests of real-world agents who may undertake causal analyses of a target system with
different goals in mind. We demonstrate that by failing to incorporate pragmatic information, CFL
is prone to errors in both directions – failing to cluster values of a causal variable that should be
1. Chalupka et al.’s approach is related to work by Hoel et al. (2013) and Hoel (2017). Although Hoel et al.’s formal
approach (unlike Chalupka et al.’s) explicitly incorporates information theory, the approaches are similar in that
they define an optimal coarse-graining for variables in a causal model using only the probabilistic relationships
between variables. Additionally, work by Beckers et al. (2019) builds on work in Beckers and Halpern (2019) and
Rubenstein et al. (2017) to define a scheme for coarse-graining causal variables such that the resulting causal graph is
an approximation, to some degree of precision, of the underlying, fine-grained graph. While what we present here is
in broad agreement with the spirit of this approach, our proposal is different in that it explicitly represents the extent
to which the optimal level of approximation can be determined by the pragmatic interests of an agent.
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grouped together, and clustering values of an effect variable that should be kept separate. We present
an algorithm for pragmatic causal feature learning (PCFL) that avoids these pitfalls without sacri-
ficing any of the measure-theoretic advantages of the original CFL method.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Following a brief overview of notation, we
outline the original CFL algorithm in Sect. 2. We present two examples in Sect. 3 that demonstrate
how CFL can generate errors even in relatively simple cases. We introduce PCFL in Sect. 4, outline
an algorithm for implementing the procedure in Sect. 5, and present experimental results in Sect. 6.
Sect. 7 concludes.
2. Causal Feature Learning
Let (C,E) be a pair of discretely-valued random variables in a set V . Let (V, E , p(·)) be a Bayesian
network in which E is an acyclic set of ordered pairs (or directed edges) of variables in V , and p(·) is
a joint probability distribution over the cross-product of the ranges of the variables in V . In the graph
G = (V, E), E is a descendant of C. In keeping with the theory of Bayesian networks developed by
Spirtes et al. (2000), the graph (V, E) is Markov to the probability distribution p(·). Following Pearl
(2000), let p(ei|cˆj) be an interventional conditional probability, in which the notation cˆj indicates
that the value of C has been set via an exogenous intervention on the system represented by the
Bayesian network (V, E , p(·)). Let RX be the range of a random variable X . Finally, a set A is a
quotient set of a set B iff each element of A is an equivalence class of elements of B, according to
some equivalence relation∼. The quotient set relation will be relevant to our subsequent discussion
of coarse-graining variables in a Bayes net.
Chalupka et al.’s proposal for coarsening variables in causal models is straightforward. First,
they define equivalence relations over the ranges of cause and effect variables. These equivalence
relations form the basis of a coarsening process that generates macrovariables whose values are just
the equivalence classes of the microvariables. Chalupka et al. define the equivalence relation ∼c
over the range RC as follows:
Causal Equivalence: cj ∼c ck with respect to E iff p(ei|cˆj) = p(ei|cˆk) ∀ei ∈ RE .
Let C†[E] be the causal coarsening of C with respect to E iff its range RC†[E] is the quotient set of
RC induced by the equivalence relation∼c with respect to E. Chalupka et al.’s equivalence relation
∼e over the range RE is defined as follows:
Effect Equivalence: ei ∼e es with respect to C iff p(ei|cˆk) = p(es|cˆk) ∀ck ∈ RC .
Let E∗[C] be the effect coarsening of E with respect to C iff its range RE∗[C] is the quotient set of
RE induced by the equivalence relation ∼e with respect to C.
Chalupka et al.’s principal formal achievement is to prove that, except in a Lebesgue measure
zero subset of cases, the causal coarsening and the effect coarsening of a given variable can be
learned from observational rather than experimental data. To state their result in a perspicuous way,
we first define additional equivalence relations and coarsenings over the variables in the cause-effect
pair (C,E). Let us begin with the observational causal equivalence relation ∼oc, which is defined
as follows:
Observational Causal Equivalence: cj ∼oc ck with respect to E iff p(ei|cj) =
p(ei|ck) ∀ei ∈ RE .
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Note that the sole difference between observational causal equivalence and causal equivalence sim-
pliciter is that the former is defined using observational conditional probabilities (i.e., conditional
probabilities such that the conditioning event is not set via an intervention), whereas the latter is
defined using causal conditional probabilities (i.e., conditional probabilities such that the condition-
ing event is set via an intervention). Let Coc[E] be the observational causal coarsening of C with
respect to E iff the range RCoc[E] is the quotient set of the range RC induced by the equivalence
relation ∼oc with respect to E. Similar definitions of an observational equivalence relation and
accompanying coarsening can be given for the effect variable:
Observational Effect Equivalence: ei ∼oe es with respect toC iff p(ei|ck) = p(es|ck)
∀ck ∈ RC .
Let Eoe[C] be the observational effect coarsening of E with respect to C iff the range of Eoe[C] is a
quotient set of the range of E according to the equivalence relation ∼oe with respect to C.
The distributions p(E|cj) and p(E|cˆj) are not necessarily equivalent. For instance, the two
may diverge due to some confounding variable Z that is a cause of both C and E. Alternatively,
Z may be an effect of C and a cause of E. In both cases, there may be differences between
observational and interventional distributions, such that the observational coarsenings will differ
from causal coarsenings of both the cause and effect variables. Chalupka et al. argue that when we
coarsen fine-grained cause and effect variables, we can almost always ignore the distorting influence
of potential confounders.
Proposition 1 (Chalupka et al. 2017, p. 149). Let C, E, and Z be variables in a graph G such
that C is an ancestor of E and Z is a possible confounder of the causal relationship between C
and E. Consider the set of possible joint probability distributions over C, E, and Z. Let C†[E]
and Coc[E] be the causal coarsening and observational causal coarsening of C, respectively, in
any such probability distribution. Let E∗[C] and Eoe[C] be the effect coarsening and observational
effect coarsening of E, respectively, in any such probability distribution. The set of joint probability
distributions over C, E, and Z such that the range of C†[E] is not a quotient set of the range of
Coc[E] and the range of E∗[C] is not a quotient set of the range of Eoe[C] is Lebesgue measure zero
within the set of all possible joint distributions over C, E, and Z.
This result has a putatively important practical consequence. Suppose that we want to find the causal
coarsening of some fine-grained variable C that is a cause of some other fine-grained variable E.
If we are guided solely by the coarsening strategies outlined above, then doing so would require
a separate intervention for each value of C, since each causal conditional probability would be
needed to determine which values of C and E are equivalent. However, equipped with Proposition
1, we can instead use a potentially more efficient procedure. Using just observational data, we can
coarsen the microvariable C into the observational macrovariable Coc[E]. We can then intervene to
set Coc[E] to each of its values, and thereby determine which (if any) are equivalent according to
the relation ∼c with respect to E, thereby generating the causal coarsening C†[E]. This procedure
is potentially more efficient since |RCoc[E] | ≤ |RC |. The procedure is justified just in case the joint
probability distribution over C, E, and Z is such that C†[E] is a coarsening of Coc[E], a condition
that provably only fails for a measure zero set of probability distributions. An analogous argument
applies to the effect variable E.
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[0,49] [50,69]
Marlboro .026 .25
Other .024 .25
Nothing .001 .05
[70,90] [90,Inf]
Marlboro .698 .026
Other .702 .024
Nothing .948 .001
Table 1: Causal CPT
[0,49] [50,69]
Marlboro -950 1100
Other -990 1050
Nothing -1000 1000
[70,90] [90,Inf]
Marlboro 2100 2150
Other 2050 2145
Nothing 2000 2050
Table 2: Utilities for Smoking Decision
3. Problems for Causal Feature Learning
Suppose that a person’s mortality age in years is represented by an effect variable D such that
RD = {[0,49], [50,69], [70,89], [90,Inf]}. The causal variable S describes the
smoking habits of individuals, withRS = {Marlboro, Other, Nothing}. All causal condi-
tional probabilities are given in Table 1. In this example, the probability distribution over the effect
variable given an intervention making someone a Marlboro smoker is very similar to the probabil-
ity distribution over the effect variable given an intervention making someone a smoker of other
brands. One could say that, for many practical purposes, the two values of the causal variable are
equivalent, and only trivially non-equivalent, such that the value space of the causal variable should
be coarsened into the two-element set {Smoker, Non-Smoker}. However, CFL recommends
against such a coarsening and therefore fails to satisfy an intuitive desideratum for any coarsening
procedure – namely, that it groups together causal values that are only trivially non-equivalent in a
given context.
CFL can also lead to counterintuitive results for effect variable coarsening. Consider again the
conditional probability distribution in Table 1. On Chalupka et al.’s account, the values [0,49]
and [90,Inf] should be coarsened into a single discontinuous value [0,49] ∨ [90,Inf].
However, this coarse-grained value does not seem to pick out any meaningful scientific category.
After all, dying before age fifty and dying after age ninety are very different outcomes from both an
ontological and a pragmatic standpoint. Yet these outcomes are equivalent according to Chalupka et
al.’s definition. Thus, CFL fails to satisfy another commonsense desideratum of any causal coarsen-
ing procedure – namely, that it not group together effect variables that are only trivially equivalent
in a given context.
4. Pragmatic Causal Feature Learning
In this section, we present a novel approach to CFL wherein values of the cause and effect variables
are coarsened together iff doing so does not decrease the maximum expected utility of intervening
on the causal variable for an agent with a pragmatic interest in the target system. To formalize this
idea, let u(·) : RC × RE → R be a function that represents the utility some agent receives when
a given pair of cause and effect values obtains. For each value cj of the causal variable, we define
the following set of utilities UE|cj = {u(cj , e1), . . . , u(cj , en)} and set of interventional conditional
probabilities PE|cˆj = {p(e1|cˆj), . . . , p(en|cˆj)}. The expected utility of setting causal variable C to
value cj via an intervention, for an agent with a utility function defined over the product spaceRC×
RE , is given by the inner product of these two sets. Let ηu(C,E) = maxcj∈RC 〈UE|cj , PE|cˆj 〉 denote
4
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this agent’s maximum expected utility over possible causal interventions. To illustrate, consider an
agent who is deliberating whether to smoke cigarettes, and which brand to smoke. The agent’s
payoffs are given in Table 2. Using the interventional conditional probability table shown in Table
1, we calculate that if S is a variable such that the possible interventions on S are the smoker statuses
listed in the rows of Table 2, and the four death age categories in the columns of Table 2 comprise the
range of a variable D, then ηu(S,D) ≈ 1947.05. In what follows, we define equivalence relations
over fine-grained cause and effect variables such that the corresponding coarsenings maximize ηu(·).
We define a pragmatic equivalence relation ∼pc between two values of the causal variable:
Pragmatic Causal Equivalence: cj ∼pc ck with respect toE iff either of the following
holds: i) 〈UE|cj , PE|cˆj 〉 = 〈UE|ck , PE|cˆk〉 = ηu(C,E), ii) 〈UE|cj , PE|cˆj 〉 6= ηu(C,E)
and 〈UE|ck , PE|cˆk〉 6= ηu(C,E).
Cpc[E] is the pragmatic causal coarsening of C with respect toE iff its rangeRCpc[E] is the quotient
set of RC induced by the equivalence relation ∼pc with respect to E. By construction, Cpc[E] is a
Boolean variable that takes a value of 1 for all and only those fine-grained cj that maximize an
agent’s expected utility according to some function u(·). All other values of C correspond to sub-
optimal interventions from the point of view of an agent who aims to maximize expected utility.
Using Tables 1 and 2, one can verify that Marlboro and Other are pragmatic causal equivalents.
Thus, PCFL successfully coarsens together these two values of C, whereas CFL fails to do so. We
define a pragmatic equivalence relation ∼pe between two values of the effect variable:
Pragmatic Effect Equivalence: ei ∼pe es with respect to C iff u(ck, ei) = u(ck, es)
∀ck ∈ RC .
Epe[C] is the pragmatic effect coarsening of E with respect to C iff its range REpe[C] is the quotient
set of RE induced by the equivalence relation ∼pe with respect to C. Using Table 2, one can
verify that [0,49] and [90,Inf] are not pragmatic effect equivalents. Thus, PCFL successfully
refrains from coarsening together these two values of E, whereas CFL fails to do so.
We show that PCFL has the same measure-theoretic advantages as CFL. First, we define the
following observational pragmatic equivalence relation over RC :
Observational Pragmatic Causal Equivalence: cj ∼opc ck with respect to E iff
〈UE|cj , PE|cj 〉 = 〈UE|ck , PE|ck〉.
There are two salient differences between observational pragmatic causal equivalence and pragmatic
causal equivalence simpliciter. First, the observational pragmatic causal equivalence is calculated
using conditional probability sets of the form PE|cj = {p(e1|cj), . . . , p(en|cj)}, which contains
observational conditional probabilities rather than interventional conditional probabilities. Second,
observational pragmatic causal equivalence is not assessed relative to any maximum expected util-
ity; we only check whether expected utility is the same, given an observation of each value of C.
Let Copc[E] be the observational pragmatic causal coarsening of C with respect to E iff its
range RCopc[E] is the quotient set of RC induced by the equivalence relation∼opc with respect to E.
We can now state the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Let C, E, and Z be variables in a graph G such that C is an ancestor of E, and Z
is a possible confounder of the causal relationship between C and E. Consider the set of possible
joint probability distributions over C, E, and Z. Let Cpc[E] and Copc[E] be the pragmatic causal
5
Algorithm 1 CFL
input : D = {(c1, e1), . . . , (cN , eN )}
Cluster - a clustering algorithm
output : W (ci), T (ei)
1: Regress f ← argminf
∑N
1 (f(ci)− ei)2;
2: Let W (ci)← Cluster(f(c1), . . . , f(cN ))[ci];
3: Let Range(W ) = {coc[E]1 , . . . , coc[E]υ };
4: Let Eβ ← {ei|W (ci) = coc[E]β and (ci, ei) ∈ D};
5: Let g(ei)← [kNN(ei,Eβ), . . . ,kNN(ei,Eυ)];
6: Let T (ei)← Cluster(g(e1), . . . , g(eN ))[ei];
Algorithm 2 PCFL
input : D = {(c1, e1), . . . , (cN , eN )}
U = {u(c1, e1), . . . , u(cN , eN )}
Cluster - a clustering algorithm
output : Wp(ci), Tp(ei)
1: Regress f ← argminf
∑N
1 (f(ci)− u(ci, ei))2;
2: Let Wp(ci)← Cluster(f(c1), . . . , f(cN ))[ci];
3: Let g(ei)← [u(c1, e1), . . . , u(cN , eN )];
4: Let Tp(ei)← Cluster(g(e1), . . . , g(eN ))[ei];
coarsening and observational pragmatic causal coarsening of C, respectively, in any such proba-
bility distribution. The set of joint probability distributions over C, E, and Z such that the range
of Cpc[E] is not a quotient set of the range of Copc[E] is Lebesgue measure zero within the set of all
possible joint distributions over C, E, and Z.
There is no formal analog of the causal coarsening theorem for pragmatic effect coarsening. How-
ever, it is still the case that we can efficiently learn the pragmatic coarsening of an effect variable
from just the observational conditional probability distribution over the causal variable, with failure
only occurring in a Lebesgue measure zero subset of probability distributions. This is because the
pragmatic effect equivalence relation holds or does not hold between two values of an effect vari-
able independently of the probability distribution over the cause-effect pair (C,E). Thus, we can
use the following procedure to learn the pragmatic coarsening of a pair (C,E) from observational
data. First, obtain the observational pragmatic coarsening Copc[E]. Next, intervene on each value
of copc[E]j ∈ RCopc[E] and calculate 〈UE|cˆopc[E]j , PE|cˆopc[E]j 〉 to obtain the pragmatic causal coarsening
Cpc[E]. This procedure will only fail to obtain the true range of Cpc[E] on a Lebesgue measure zero
subset of probability distributions over (C,E). Finally, use the utility function over RC × RE to
determine which values of the effect variable are pragmatic effect equivalents in order to obtain the
pragmatically coarsened cause-effect pair (Cpc[E], Epe[C]).
5. An Algorithm for Pragmatic Causal Feature Learning
Alg. 1 presents Chalupka et al. (2016a)’s original CFL algorithm, rephrased to conform to the for-
malisms used in this paper. Note that this algorithm only finds the observational coarsenings of the
fine-grained cause and effect variable. Thus, it serves mainly to compress the space of interventions
needed to learn the full causal coarsenings C†[E] and E∗[C], under the assumption that the interven-
tional conditional probability distribution over E, given each intervention on C, is not known and
cannot be learned via inference from the true causal structure (i.e., the true causal structure is also
not known). The algorithm assumes that the fine-grained variablesC andE can take a finite number
of continuous or categorical values, and takes as input N observations of values for C and E. Note
that line 1 regresses E on C with L2 loss, thereby learning the conditional expectation E[E|C].
In general E[E|cj ] = E[E|ck] is a necessary but insufficient condition for cj ∼oc ck with respect
to E. The mean value of a random variable can be identical under two distributions even if those
distributions are not identical. However, Chalupka et al. use E[E|cj ] = E[E|ck] as a “heuristic
6
CAUSAL FEATURE LEARNING FOR UTILITY-MAXIMIZING AGENTS
Z1
Z2 C E
Figure 1: Causal diagram for the graph M .
E = −2 E = −1 E = 1 E = 2
C = −2 .248 .189 .315 .248
C = −1 .252 .248 .248 .252
C = 1 .252 .248 .248 .252
C = 2 .248 .315 .189 .248
Table 3: Expected conditional probabilities,
with expectation taken over the graph M .
indicator” for cj ∼oc ck with respect to E, while accepting that this heuristic may sometimes fail
(2016a, p. 6). Note also that the algorithm kNN in line 5 returns the distance between ei and its k-th
nearest neighbor in the set constructed in Line 4, for some arbitrarily selected k.2 If two values ei
and es of E are the same distance from their k-th nearest neighbor in each of the sets constructed
in Line 4, such that they will be clustered together in line 6, then p(ei|coc[E]β ) = p(es|coc[E]β ) for all
c
oc[E]
β , as shown by Fukunaga and Hostetler (1973).
Alg. 2 provides pseudo-code for PCFL. Crucially, this algorithm takes as an additional input
the utilities that the agent assigns to each observed cause-effect pair. Note that Line 1 regresses
U on C with L2 loss, thereby finding the conditional expected utility E[u(ci, E)|ci] for each ci.
Since E[u(ci, E)|ci] = 〈UE|ci , PE|ci〉, the regression in line 1 allows us to define, in Line 2, a func-
tion Wp(·) whose range consists of all and only those values of the observational pragmatic causal
coarsening Copc[E] that appear in the dataset D. Unlike in CFL, the expectations E[u(ci, E)|ci]
are not heuristic indicators of an equivalence relationship, the use of which may lead to inaccurate
output. Rather, we can use these expectations to directly learn which values of C are observational
pragmatic causal equivalents with respect to E.
6. Experimental Results
6.1 Simulated Data
We implement Alg. 1 and Alg. 2 on a simulated dataset to compare the performance of both meth-
ods.3 Consider a Bayes net M (see Fig. 1) with two unobserved binary variables Z1 ∼ Bern(0.5)
and Z2 ∼ Bern(0.5). Let RC = RE = {−2,−1, 1, 2}. Values of the causal variable C are fixed
by the exogenous variables as follows: C = −2 if Z1 = 0 and Z2 = 0, C = −1 if Z1 = 0
and Z2 = 1, C = 1 and Z1 = 1 and Z2 = 0, and C = 2 if Z1 = 1 and Z2 = 1. Conditional
probabilities for the effect variable E are given by the equation P (E|C,Z1) = σ(α+Cβ+Z1γ),
where σ(·) denotes the softmax transformation and linear parameters are computed to induce the
conditional probabilities listed in Table 3. Note that the exogenous variable Z1 has directed edges
into both C and E, thereby confounding our causal relationship of interest, C → E. It is clear from
Table 3 that C = −1 and C = 1 are observational causal equivalents, while E = −2 and E = 2
are observational effect equivalents, according to the definitions of Sect. 2. Thus, we expect CFLs
coarsened conditional probability table to appear as it does in Table 4. This is empirically verified
by a simulation experiment in which we run CFL on 10,000 samples drawn from P (M). Resulting
probabilities are reported in Table 5.
2. Chalupka et al. use Euclidean distance, but other measures could of course be substituted here.
3. Code for this simulation is available at https://github.com/davidbkinney/pcfl.
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E = −2 ∨ 2 E = −1 E = 1
C = −2 .496 .189 .315
C = −1 ∨ 1 .504 .248 .248
C = 2 .496 .315 .189
Table 4: Expected output of CFL algorithm on
data sampled from M .
E = −2 ∨ 2 E = −1 E = 1
C = −2 .491 .323 .36
C = −1 ∨ 1 .510 .255 .236
C = 2 .514 .295 .191
Table 5: Observed output of CFL algorithm on
data sampled from M .
E = −2 E = −1 E = 1 E = 2
C = −2 1 2 2 4
C = −1 8 5 5 0
C = 1 5 8 8 9
C = 2 4 2 2 1
Table 6: Utility matrix for PCFL simulation experiment.
To test the performance of Alg. 2, we introduce a utility matrix over cause-effect pairs (see
Table 6). Using these utilities, along with the conditional probabilities in Table 3, one can calculate
the expected utility of each cj ∈ RC , and observe that C = −2 and C = 2 are observational
pragmatic causal equivalents; both have an expected utility of 2.25. By contrast, the expected
utilities ofC = −1 andC = 1 are 4.50 and 7.50, respectively, and are therefore only observationally
pragmatically equivalent to themselves. In addition, we observe that E = −1 and E = 1 are
observational pragmatic effect equivalents, while E = −2 and E = 2 are only observationally
pragmatically equivalent to themselves. On this basis, and retaining the assumption that all values of
C are equiprobable, we expect that PCFL will yield the coarsened conditional probabilities shown in
Table 7. This is verified by our simulation test, where we obtain the correct pragmatic observational
coarsening. Resulting probabilities are reported in Table 8.
We argue that, in the context of the utility function implied by Table 6, the coarsening in Table
8 is a more appropriate high-level representation of the target system than the coarsening in Table
5. This is because the former coarsens together those values of the cause and effect variables that
represent equally desirable states of affairs, from the point of view of an agent whose preferences
are represented by the utilities given in Table 6. The coarsening shown in Table 5 does not have
a similar significance, and in some applications can lead to errors, as shown in Sect. 3. Note that
the distinction is not reducible to continuity assumptions, since an agent may have valid reasons to
coarsen together nonadjacent regions of the feature space. For instance, it is common in statistics to
distinguish between significant and insignificant results of two-tailed hypothesis tests, a procedure
which naturally groups together the largest and smallest values of a test statistic. Similarly, PCFL
clusters C = −2 and C = 2 together in this simulation, in accordance with the given utilities.
E = −2 E = −1 ∨ 1 E = 2
C = −2 ∨ 2 .248 .504 .248
C = −1 .252 .496 .252
C = 1 .252 .496 .252
Table 7: Expected output of PCFL
algorithm on data sampled from M .
E = −2 E = −1 ∨ 1 E = 2
C = −2 ∨ 2 .251 .498 .252
C = −1 .257 .494 .249
C = 1 .261 .487 .252
Table 8: Observed output of PCFL
algorithm on data sampled from M .
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Figure 2: Alg. 1 output for the El Nin˜o dataset
(2016a). Zonal wind fields are visualized left,
sea surface temperatures right.
Figure 3: Alg. 2 output for the El Nin˜o dataset.
Zonal wind fields are visualized left, sea surface
temperatures right.
6.2 El Nin˜o Data
We re-analyzed the dataset that Chalupka et al. (2016a) use in their study of El Nin˜o using both CFL
and PCFL.4 This dataset includes weekly average zonal wind speeds and sea surface temperatures
from the same region of the Equatorial Pacific, each consisting of a 9 × 55 matrix of real numbers
for each of 13,140 weeks. Fig. 2 shows the results of running CFL on this dataset; the algorithm
picks out an Easterly Equatorial wind pattern, which causes slightly colder sea surface temperatures;
a Westerly Equatorial wind pattern, which causes the warmer sea surface temperatures associated
with the El Nin˜o effect; an Easterly North of the Equator wind pattern, which causes the colder
temperatures associated with the La Nin˜a effect; and an Easterly South of the Equator wind pattern,
which causes slightly warmer sea surface temperatures.
To implement PCFL, we let X and Y be the set of possible directional wind speeds and temper-
atures, respectively, in a given region of the Western Pacific. We then defined the following utility
function over RX ×RY , where y∗ is the temperature rounded to the first decimal:
u(x, y) = −1 + 1√
.02pi
e
(y∗−26)2
.02 (1)
Utilities for temperature observations are therefore determined by their distance from a mean of
26◦C using a radial basis function kernel with small bandwidth and a scale shift of −1. This en-
codes a strong preference on the part of the relevant agent for temperatures near 26◦C, rather than
any observer-neutral value that this temperature might have. Note that in this case, the utility u(x, y)
is independent of the causal value x. As our earlier experiment on simulated data shows, our frame-
work does not generally assume or require such independence.
Fig. 3 shows the output of PCFL when it is set to discover four clusters of both X and Y . The
key difference between our results and those of Chalupka et al. is that whereas CFL picks out four
trends in the data, the only distinct wind direction/speed pattern that PCFL identifies is an extreme
version of the Westerly Equatorial wind pattern, shown in the second panel from the top. This causes
mostly negative outcomes, as indicated in the pattern to the right of the Westerly Equatorial wind
pattern; the darker orange regions represent highly negative outcomes, which are not offset by the
small patches of dark-blue, positive outcomes in the upper left corner. Recalling that the Westerly
Equatorial wind pattern is a cause of the El Nin˜o effect, our interpretation of this result is that an
4. Code for our algorithm is available at https://github.com/davidbkinney/pcfl.
9
agent with the utility function defined by Eq. 1 is highly averse to the El Nin˜o weather pattern and
relatively unconcerned about other meteorological phenomena. Thus, this agent picks out two main
classes of wind patterns: the Westerly Equatorial pattern and other patterns.
7. Discussion and Conclusion
The PCFL algorithm is a principled extension of Chalupka et al.’s CFL method. By incorporating
pragmatic information about the inquiring agent’s preferences over outcomes, we avoid certain
counterintuitive and undesirable consequences of the original CFL algorithm without sacrificing
its attractive measure theoretic properties. Our approach is also more computationally efficient if
agents rely on utility functions less complex than the kNN algorithm. However, one could argue
that this trivializes the problem of causal feature learning. If we are told what some agent cares
about, then it seems that such an algorithm does not discover anything about the system under
study, but instead regurgitates the interests of an arbitrary agent. In response, we argue that the
dependence of our algorithm on an input utility function speaks to an important fact about the
nature of scientific discovery. We maintain that the process of discovery, including the discovery
of the salient possible macro-level states of a system from micro-level data, is a fundamentally
goal-oriented process. A similar sentiment is echoed in work by Wellen and Danks (2016), who
argue that the interaction between agential goals and the environment is essential to understanding
feature learning. Another framework that uses a similar formal apparatus to discuss coarsening,
but coarsens variables according to different equivalence relations, is the framework of “epsilon-
machines for decisional states” put forward by Brodu (2011). It would be a potentially fruitful
extension of this paper to explore the connections between our framework and these approaches.
In addition, Beckers et al. (2019) propose a more complex formalization of the relationship be-
tween coarse-grained and fine-grained models than the quotient-set relation used by both Chalupka
et al. and ourselves, but do not consider the pragmatic context in which coarsening occurs. It would
be fruitful to consider how the approach proposed here contrasts with their model.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The proof closely follows the logic and methods of the first part of the proof of the causal
coarsening theorem in Chalupka et al. (2017). We begin by introducing the following notation, for
the purpose of concision: i[i, l, j] = p(ei|zl, cj), β[j, l] = p(cj |zl), γ[l] = p(zl). Note that zl is
any value of a variable Z that is a potential confounder of the relationship between C and E, where
RZ has cardinality w. Next, we define the following three vectors: ~i = [i[1, 1, 1], . . . , i[n,w,m]],
~β = [β[1, 1], . . . , i[m,w]], ~γ = [γ[1], . . . , γ[w]]. Each triple (~i, ~β,~γ) is a point in a space Rd. The
set of all such points forms a simplex S ⊆ Rd. We want to show that the subset S ′ ⊆ S containing
all joint distributions such that there are two cj and ck such that cj ∼opc ck with respect to E but
cj 6∼pc ck with respect to E is Lebesgue measure zero in P [~i, ~β,~γ], where P [~i, ~β,~γ] is the space
of all possible points (~i, ~β,~γ). To do this, we first fix ~i = ~i∗ and ~β = ~β∗, so that ~γ is the only
free parameter. Let P [~γ;~i∗, ~β∗] be the set of all joint probability distributions consistent with this
fixing of parameters. We proceed by showing that S ′ ∩ P [~γ;~i∗, ~β∗] is Lebesgue measure zero in
P [~γ;~i∗, ~β∗], and then integrating over all possible~i and ~β. To show that S ′∩P [~γ;~i∗, ~β∗] is Lebesgue
measure zero in P [~γ;~i∗, ~β∗], pick any two values cj and ck such that cj ∼opc ck but cj 6∼pc ck. If
no such pair exists, then we are done. If such a pair exists, then the fact that cj ∼opc ck means that
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the following constraint holds, for the fixed utility function u(·):
p(cj)
−1
n∑
i=1
w∑
l=1
u(cj , ei)i
∗[i, l, j]β∗[j, l]γ[l] = p(ck)−1
n∑
i=1
w∑
l=1
u(ck, ei)i
∗[i, l, k]β∗[k, l]γ[l] (2)
We note that p(ck) =
∑w
l=1 β
∗[k, l]γ[l] and p(cj) =
∑w
l=1 β
∗[j, l]γ[l], which means that, after some
algebra, (2) implies:
w∑
l′=1
w∑
l=1
γ[l′]γ[l]
( n∑
i=1
u(cj , ei)i
∗[i, l, j]β∗[k, l′]β∗[j, l]−
n∑
i=1
u(ck, ei)i
∗[i, l, k]β∗[j, l′]β∗[k, l]
)
= 0 (3)
Using an algebraic lemma from Okamoto (1973), we know that S ′ ∩ P [~γ;~i∗, ~β∗] is Lebesgue mea-
sure zero in P [~γ;~i∗, ~β∗] if this constraint is non-trivial, i.e. if there are ~γ such that (3) does not hold.
To show that this is the case, suppose first that all entries in ~γ equal 1/w. If (3) does not hold,
then we are done. If (3) does hold under this condition, then there are at least two pairs of values
(zq+ , zv+) and (zq− , zv−) such that the following hold:
n∑
i=1
u(cj , ei)i
∗[i, q+, j]β∗[k, v+]β∗[j, q+]−
n∑
i=1
u(ck, ei)i
∗[i, v+, k]β∗[j, q+]β∗[k, v+] > 0 (4)
n∑
i=1
u(cj , ei)i
∗[i, q−, j]β∗[k, v−]β∗[j, q−]−
n∑
i=1
u(ck, ei)i
∗[i, v−, k]β∗[j, q−]β∗[k, v−] < 0 (5)
This assumes that there is a zl such that (2) does not hold. Indeed, if (2) held, then it would not be
the case that cj ∼opc ck with respect toE but cj 6∼pc ck with respect toE (since the expected utility,
given cj or ck, would be the same regardless of the value of the confounder, such that there would
be no difference between the interventional and observational probability distribution over E, given
either value) and the proof would already be complete. The two inequalities above imply that either
zq+ 6= zq− , zv+ 6= zv− , or both. Assume zq+ 6= zq− , and pick any positive  < min{1/w, 1−1/w}.
For any zl such that zl 6= zq+ and zl 6= zq− , let γ[l] = 1/w, while γ[q+] = 1/w +  and γ[q−] =
1/w − . This way,∑wl′=1∑wl=1 γ[l′]γ[l] is unchanged from the case where each entry in ~γ is 1/w,
but it is nevertheless the case that (3) does not hold. We can repeat these same steps under the
assumption that zv+ 6= zv− , and under the assumption that zq+ 6= zq− and zv+ 6= zv− , generating
the same result in each case. Since (3) is non-trivial, we know that S ′ ∩ P [~γ;~i∗, ~β∗] is Lebesgue
measure zero in P [~γ;~i∗, ~β∗].
Next, we integrate over ~i and ~β to show that S ′ is Lebesgue measure zero in P [~i, ~β,~γ]. Let
S ′ = ∪~i,~βP˜ [~γ;~i, ~β] ⊆ P [~i, ~β,~γ] be the Lebesgue measure zero set of all possible joint distributions
P [~γ;~i, ~β] such that cj ∼opc ck with respect to E but cj 6∼pc ck with respect to E. We define an
indicator function θ such that θ(~i, ~β,~γ) = 1 if γ ∈ P˜ [~γ;~i, ~β] and θ(~i, ~β,~γ) = 0 otherwise. By the
basic properties of positive measures, we have µ(S′) =
∫
P [~i,~β,~γ]
θ(~i, ~β,~γ) dµ. For concision, let
A = Rw×n, let B = Rn×w, and let G = Rw. We calculate µ(S′) as follows:
µ(S′) =
∫
A×B×G
θ(~i, ~β,~γ) d(~i, ~β,~γ) =
∫
A×B
∫
G
θ(~i, ~β,~γ) d(~γ) d(~i, ~β)
=
∫
A×B
µ(P˜ [~γ;~i, ~β]) d(~i, ~β) =
∫
A×B
0 d(~i, ~β) = 0 (6)
11
Thus, the subset S ′ ⊆ S containing all joint distributions such that there are two cj and ck such that
cj ∼opc ck but cj 6∼pc ck is Lebesgue measure zero in P [~i, ~β,~γ].
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